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I. Introduction
From the Defense of Marriage Act to 
individual state bans on homosexual adoptions, 
governmental actions are preventing homosexuals 
from enjoying the rights of parenthood.2 As of 2007, 
over 200,000 children have parents of the same 
sex, and many of these children are adopted.3 More 
specifically, in Louisiana, more than a quarter of the 
state’s 12,000 same-sex couples are raising around 
3,000 children.4 Despite the rising presence of same-
sex parents, various laws and other governmental 
efforts hamstring these parents’ efforts at legitimacy. 
Some of these actions come at a constitutional cost.
One particular Louisiana couple sought to 
legitimize their out-of-state adoption. Oren Adar 
and Mickey Ray Smith requested a Louisiana birth 
certificate listing both individuals as parents of “Infant 
J.”5 Their application was denied.6 Attempting to 
assuage the couple’s concerns, the Louisiana Registrar 
offered to issue a birth certificate naming only one 
partner.7 When the couple turned to the judiciary 
to seek help, the federal Fifth Circuit rejected the 
parents’ request in Adar v. Smith.8 As a result of this 
decision, the parents of Infant J are without a legal 
Louisiana birth certificate identifying them as such.
This note will analyze Adar temporally: 
addressing its past, present, and future. Part II sets 
the stage by laying out the case’s past, comparing 
the Fifth and Tenth Circuit’s opinions on Full Faith 
and Credit and out-of-state adoptions. This part 
also outlines background information: the adoption 
process in New York where the couple adopted 
Infant J and the history of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause (the “Clause”). Part III then takes on the 
case’s present, arguing that the Fifth Circuit creates 
a circuit split over Full Faith and Credit and out-
of-state adoptions, despite the court’s claims to the 
contrary. Part IV resolves the case’s future, applying 
Full Faith and Credit history to the circuit split. 
This note urges future courts addressing these issues 
to follow the Tenth Circuit’s rationale as it is more 
consistent with the Clause’s history and will have 
less detrimental effects for parents and children. 
Finally, Part V predicts how the errors of the Adar 
decision specifically will be detrimental for out-of-
state parents, homosexual parents, and the adopted 
children themselves. Unless and until future courts 
reject the rationale in Adar, these parties will continue 
to be severely disadvantaged—at a Constitutional 
cost.
II. The Past: Opinions, Adoptions, and Full 
Faith and Credit
A.  The Fifth Circuit Denies: Adar v. Smith9
Oren Adar and Mickey Ray Smith legally 
adopted Infant J in a New York family court in 
2006.10 Because the California couple could not add 
Infant J to their employer’s insurance without proof 
of parentage, they requested a birth certificate from 
the infant’s state of birth—Louisiana.11 The Registrar, 
who directs the issuing of birth certificates, relied on 
advice from the state Attorney General and denied the 
couple’s request based on the state’s public policy.12
The parents then sued Darlene Smith in 
her official capacity as State Registrar and Director 
of the State’s Vital Records and Statistics in federal 
district court.13 The couple sought both injunctive 
and declaratory relief, asking the court to find: 
(1) that the Registrar’s denial violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,14 
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(2) that the Registrar’s denial violated the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause,15 and (3) that the Registrar ought 
to issue a new birth certificate listing both parents.16 
The district court granted the couple’s motion for 
summary judgment.17 On appeal, a three-judge 
panel for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.18 However, the 
Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated, reversed, and 
remanded this judgment for an entry dismissal of the 
couple’s claims.19
1. The Majority’s Rejection
The majority’s opinion largely addressed the 
Full Faith and Credit questions, glossing over both the 
justiciability and Equal Protection issues.20 The court’s 
narrow holding determined that complaints alleging a 
breach of Full Faith and Credit are not “redressable in 
federal court in a § 1983 action.”21 The court further 
stated that the Clause and its accompanying statute22 
only relieve litigants of having to retry their case in 
every forum—the “res judicata” effect.23 Therefore, 
the court stated, the couple only had procedural 
rights—not substantive rights—, which are not 
protected by § 1983 in federal courts.24 However, the 
court did not stop there. The Fifth Circuit went on to 
hold that even if the couple’s claims were cognizable 
under § 1983, the Registrar did not violate the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause when it “determin[ed] how 
to apply Louisiana’s laws to maintain its vital statistics 
records.”25
The Adar court also discussed the breadth of 
the Clause and the state actors to whom it applies, 
briefly examining the historical purpose of the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause for its finding.26 The Fifth 
Circuit noted the Clause’s historically evidentiary 
function and found that the Clause imposes a duty 
only on sister-state courts to give “the same res judicata 
effect which the issuing court would give it.”27 The 
court extended this proposition to hold that Full Faith 
and Credit, coupled with the res judicata principle of 
not having to retry the merits of a case, only imposes 
a duty on state courts.28 Thus, in the majority’s view, 
the only entities that can violate Full Faith and Credit 
are courts; non-judicial state actors are exempt from 
the constitutional mandate of the Clause.29 The court 
then addressed a practical concern regarding which 
state actors are capable of assessing Full Faith and 
Credit.30 After all, “a judgment is not entitled to full 
faith and credit unless the second court finds that the 
questions at issue in the first case” have been properly 
argued and that the original court had proper 
jurisdiction.31 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit pointed 
out that only courts are able to determine whether 
jurisdiction is proper. Because other state actors lack 
such judicial acumen, Full Faith and Credit can only 
bind state courts.
Next, the court addressed relief under § 
1983.32 The Fifth Circuit cited a case involving the 
Clause and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 
Thompson v. Thompson,33 and adopted the Thompson 
court’s rationale for its own holding that Full Faith 
and Credit complaints are not redressable under § 
1983.34 Moreover, the Adar court held that Full Faith 
and Credit claims alone are insufficient to invoke 
federal jurisdiction35; the couple should have sought 
enforcement of the original judgment in Louisiana 
state court.36 The Fifth Circuit tied this procedural 
requirement back to its reading of Thompson—that 
Full Faith and Credit claims were not redressable in 
federal courts under § 1983.37 Thus, the Fifth Circuit 
ultimately found that federal courts are not the proper 
fora for Full Faith and Credit claims.38
Another rationale for the court’s holding 
was a potential procedural protection.39 Under usual 
procedures, litigants seek enforcement of other 
state court judgments in another state’s court.40 If 
the second forum denies recognition of the sister-
state’s judgment, claims of a violation of Full Faith 
and Credit are reviewable only by the United States 
Supreme Court.41 The Fifth Circuit pointed out 
that if litigants were able to bring such claims in 
federal court under the Clause vis-à-vis § 1983, those 
litigants would enjoy the full purview of the federal 
appellate system.42 This more immediate review 
would be a considerable—indeed, “impermissible”—
advantage over those litigants who are at the hands of 
the Supreme Court’s discretion.43
Finally, the court presupposed that even if a 
federal court could hear the couple’s claim and Full 
Faith and Credit applied to non-judicial state actors, 
the Registrar did not violate Full Faith and Credit.44 
In reaching this conclusion, the court largely relied 
on the Supreme Court’s most recent Full Faith and 
Credit decision—Baker v. General Motor Corp.45 In 
Baker, the Court differentiated between the level of 
recognition afforded to a state’s judgments and to its 
statutes.46 The credit owed to judgments is “exacting,” 
while a state may make exceptions to another state’s 
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laws based on public policy.47 Furthermore, as the 
Court outlined in Baker, a state must only recognize 
another state’s judgments all the while retaining the 
right to enforce those judgments with “practices 
regarding the time, manner, and mechanisms” for 
enforcement.48 In this subsection of the opinion, 
the Fifth Circuit latched onto the “mechanism of 
enforcement” aspect of Baker.49 The court held that 
the Registrar had not refused to recognize the validity 
of the New York judgment when it applied Louisiana’s 
enforcement mechanisms to an out-of-state adoption 
decree.50 Although the Registrar acknowledged the 
couple as legal parents of Infant J, the couple did 
not acquire a right to a birth certificate, which is 
Louisiana’s mechanism of enforcement.51 Succinctly, 
the court stated that “no right created by the New 
York adoption order . . . has been frustrated” when 
the court denied the couple a birth certificate.52
B.  The Tenth Circuit Accepts: Finstuen v. 
Crutcher53
The catalyst for the Finstuen case was an 
Oklahoma amendment to its adoption code refusing 
to recognize the validity of any same-sex adoption 
from another state.54 The Finstuen plaintiffs were 
three homosexual couples who sought an injunction 
of the amendment in federal district court.55 In 
the end, the court of appeals found that only one 
couple had standing, but it nonetheless struck down 
the amendment and ordered the Oklahoma State 
Department of Health to issue birth certificates 
listing both parents.56
Although the Finstuen court devoted much 
of its attention to the issue of standing, the court 
discussed Full Faith and Credit issues as well.57 
Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit cited the same Baker 
case as the Fifth Circuit, but for a different holding 
concerning Full Faith and Credit.58 In doing so, the 
court rejected the State’s argument that requiring 
it to issue a birth certificate would be “tantamount 
to giving the sister state control over the effect of 
its judgment in Oklahoma.”59 Rather, the court 
stated that the argument “conflates Oklahoma’s 
obligation to give full faith and credit to a sister 
state’s judgment with its authority to apply its own 
state laws in deciding what state-specific rights and 
responsibilities flow from that judgment.”60 In this 
way, the Tenth Circuit tied the Clause’s historically 
evidentiary purpose to Oklahoma’s role as a sister-
state recognizing another state’s judgment.61 The 
court explained that if Oklahoma had no existing 
“mechanism” dealing with re-issuing birth certificates, 
then the couple’s claims would fail.62 However, since 
the state already had statutes instructing families on 
how to obtain a birth certificate, the State must apply 
the mechanisms to all people in the same situation.63 
Thus, the amendment violated Full Faith and Credit 
by singling out homosexual couples and out-of-state 
adoptions.64
Next, the court focused on arguments as to 
how the Oklahoma amendment violated Full Faith 
and Credit.65 The court noted that many state courts 
acknowledge the validity of out-of-state adoption 
decrees and afford them Full Faith and Credit.66 The 
Tenth Circuit then cited a Supreme Court decision, 
which held that Full Faith and Credit is honored 
so long as the second forum “does not deny the 
effective operation of the [out-of-state adoption] 
proceedings.”67 Thus the Tenth Circuit held that 
to deny the effective operation of an out-of-state 
judgment is to deny Full Faith and Credit.68
Addressing similar facts five years earlier, the 
Tenth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion. The 
Finstuen couple brought their Full Faith and Credit 
claim under § 1983 and the court did not dismiss the 
case.69 Instead, the court held that adoption decrees 
are entitled to recognition under Full Faith and 
Credit.70 Additionally, the Finstuen court directed a 
non-judicial state actor to comply with Full Faith and 
Credit and issue a birth certificate for the couple.71 
This holding diametrically opposes the Fifth Circuit’s 
holding. The Tenth and Fifth Circuits appear to 
treat adoption decrees differently, but both courts 
nevertheless discuss the level of “faith and credit” due 
to adoption decrees. The following section outlines 
adoption proceedings to better understand these 
adoption cases.
C.  Becoming a Parent
The adoption process transforms people into 
legal parents and severs former parents’ relationships 
with the adoptee.72 In this way, adoption orders 
are judgments because they are “a court’s final 
determination of the rights and obligations of the 
parties in the case . . . .”73 This section emphasizes 
the thoroughness and finality of adoption decrees 
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and, because of these qualities, shows that they are 
entitled to the highest level of Full Faith and Credit 
as judgments.74
New York statutorily authorizes those who 
may adopt and what effect that adoption decree has.75 
Furthermore, the New York legislature has given 
its adoption decrees the same force as judgments 
from any other state court.76 To effect the parental 
transformation, the judges “make an order approving 
the adoption and directing that the adoptive child 
shall thenceforth be regarded and treated in all 
respects as the child of the adoptive parents or 
parent” so long as the best interests of the child are 
being served.77 Although there are slight differences 
between perfecting a private adoption and agency 
adoption, most steps are largely the same.78 For 
example, both private and agency adoptions require 
a personal showing for examination of character, the 
filing of a formal petition, and completing numerous 
affidavits.79 Thus, in either scenario, adoptive parents 
are determined and pronounced the parents of the 
child—a transformation entitled to the highest level 
of Full Faith and Credit.80
In addition to the adoption procedures, New 
York explicitly states the effects of an adoption.81 
Upon the issuance of a New York adoption order, the 
biological parents lose all rights and responsibilities 
when the adoptive parents gain them.82 Furthermore, 
another effect of a valid adoption is that the vital 
statistics statutes provide for the issuing of a new 
birth certificate after the adoption.83 Most notably, 
the language of the section allows for no discretion for 
issuing the new birth certificate. Rather, the section 
states that a:
new certificate of birth shall be made 
whenever . . . notification is received 
by . . . the commissioner from . . . 
a judgment, order or decree relat-
ing to the adoption of such person. 
Such judgment, order or decree shall 
also be sufficient authority to make 
a new birth certificate with con-
forming change in the name of such 
person on the birth certificate of any 
of such person’s children.84
New York’s laws are comparable to those of 
most other states, which similarly do not allow for 
discretion in issuing a new birth certificate upon a 
valid adoption decree.85
The importance of this statutory background 
and comparison is that adoptions transform former 
non-parents into full-fledged parents. Additionally, it 
also shows that many states treat the issuance of birth 
certificates as part-and-parcel of a valid adoption 
decree and an incidental effect of perfecting a valid 
adoption.86 In this way, receiving the new birth 
certificate is the final step towards parenthood. Even 
if the statutes do not tether adoptions and birth 
certificates, they certainly show that states have their 
own ways of issuing birth certificates. The Full Faith 
and Credit Clause obligates states to apply these 
statutes even-handedly, and the following section on 
the Clause’s history and jurisprudence helps illustrate 
this inter-state obligation.
D.  States Interact: Full Faith and Credit
James Madison described the predecessor 
to the current Full Faith and Credit Clause as “of 
little importance under any interpretation which it 
will bear.”87 This description referred to an almost 
identical provision in the Articles of Confederation, 
which drew inspiration from former practices and 
principles of English courts.88 Although the Clause’s 
history and jurisprudence do not decisively resolve the 
current circuit split, an overview aids the discussion 
of how to ultimately resolve it.
1.  From England to America
Many Full Faith and Credit scholars have 
discussed the evidentiary purposes of the Clause.89 
Their research reveals that English courts used the 
terms “faith” and “credit” when discussing which 
documents may properly be submitted to the English 
courts.90 From the court’s perspective, enforcing 
a judgment from a foreign court may allow the 
infiltration of an “inferior” system of justice.91 Thus, 
English courts of record distinguished documents 
allowed into evidence based on the origin of the 
judgment.92 Because the drafters of the Articles of 
Confederation were familiar with English law and 
legal terminology, they likely used the phrase “full 
faith and credit” with this evidentiary meaning in 
mind.93
Nevertheless, as Madison’s quote indicates, 
early jurisprudence from various state courts reveals 
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how differently the Clause was interpreted.94 
Representative of the nation’s relative disunity under 
the Articles, some states enacted their own legislation 
regarding what faith, credit, and effect were given to 
sister-state judgments.95 This legal uncertainty about 
the meaning of the Articles of Confederation Clause 
prompted Madison to describe it as “extremely 
indeterminate.”96
The Constitutional Convention delegates 
did not spend much time debating the Clause when 
they drafted the federal Constitution.97 When the 
Clause was first brought up for discussion on August 
29, 1787, the drafters sought to clarify the meaning 
of the article.98 The issue was then delegated to a sub-
committee for clarification, and on September 3, 
the Convention voted in the current constitutional 
Article.99 Notably, Congress could now discretionarily 
declare the inter-state effects of a sister-state’s 
public acts, records, and judicial proceedings.100 
James Wilson remarked that without this “Effects 
Clause,” the constitutional Article would “amount 
to nothing more than what now takes place among 
all Independent Nations,”101 indicating that the 
Framers envisioned a more unified country than that 
under the Articles of Confederation. Many scholars 
further argue that the addition of this discretionary 
power means that the first part of the Clause is a 
self-executing replica of the former Clause.102 That 
is, despite trying to unify the country by replacing 
the Articles of Confederation, some contend that 
the framers used the terms “faith” and “credit” for 
evidentiary purposes only.103 The first time Congress 
acted on its Full Faith and Credit power was in 1790, 
passing an act with the same language of the Clause 
itself.104 This act restated Congress’s power to declare 
effects of one state’s judgments, all while passing on 
the opportunity to do so.105 Indeed, the Effects Clause 
is “relatively neglected in legal literature”106 and 
has proven “little use for” the legal community.”107 
However, this is not to say that Congress has never 
acted on its discretionary power.
As one scholar points out, Congress’s 
discretionary power has not historically commanded 
much legal attention.108 The Effects Clause—
perhaps the entire Full Faith and Credit clause—has 
generated little attention until recent decades.109 The 
recent attention may be due to the increased mobility 
of citizens and how the Clause operates in a modern 
federalist society. A particular source of interest is the 
advent of homosexual marriage and how the Clause 
obligates states to acknowledge those marriages.110 
Indeed, Congress has only exercised its discretionary 
power in family law, enacting statutes concerning 
child custody and support.111 The increasing attention 
culminated in 1996 with the passage of the Defense 
of Marriage Act (DOMA).112
The Clause’s history does not decisively 
determine its scope, much less how it resolves the 
Adar/Finstuen split. What this history does show is 
that the framers likely had the evidentiary function 
in mind when drafting the Clause. Furthermore, 
in an effort to unify the country from independent 
sovereignties and to resolve the confusion of the 
Articles of Confederation, the framers also gave 
Congress a new discretionary power to determine 
nationwide effects. Unfortunately for the issue of 
deciding the Adar/Finstuen split, Congress has not 
legislated specifically on the nationwide effects of 
adoption decrees. Nevertheless, the historical purpose 
of the Clause will indicate that the Tenth Circuit’s 
holding in Finstuen is most consistent with this 
purpose because it prevents states from denying other 
states’ citizens the full rights granted by those other 
states. Examining the Clause’s jurisprudence will 
bolster this argument as well.
2.  The Courts Tackle the Clause
As early as 1794, judges asserted that 
Congress had already declared the substantive effects 
of a sister-state’s judgments.113 Not all circuit judges, 
however, agreed with this point of view.114 The issue 
finally reached the United States Supreme Court in 
1813 in a case concerning what plea was available to a 
New York debtor in a Washington, D.C. court.115 The 
Court held that “Congress have therefore declared the 
effect of the record” in the Act of 1790.116 Some argue 
that this Court’s decision on Congress’s power was a 
“revolution.”117 However, this decision concerning 
the substantive effects of sister-state’s judgment was 
not definitive; if it were, no discussion would remain 
today as to what effects are given to a sister-state’s 
judgment. For years to come, courts would continue 
to struggle with the issue of effects of sister-state 
judgments.118
Two centuries later, the Court would again 
address the Full Faith and Credit conundrum in 
Baker.119 There the Court held that the Clause did 
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not prevent a witness from giving testimony in the 
second forum’s courts despite the first forum’s issuance 
of an injunction against the testimony.120 The Court 
cited broadly-worded precedent that envisioned 
an expansive scope for Full Faith and Credit.121 
Nevertheless, the Baker Court differentiated between 
the “credit owed to laws (legislative measures and 
common law) and to judgments.”122 However, states 
were still left to determine for themselves the “time, 
manner, and mechanisms for enforcing judgments 
. . . subject to the even-handed control of forum 
law.”123 In the end, the second forum applied its own 
mechanism to admit evidence into trial.124
The Clause’s jurisprudence throughout the 
years has been inconsistent. Early cases conflicted over 
whether Congress had acted on its power to determine 
substantive effects of sister-states’ judgments.125 
The most recent decision tempers broadly-worded 
precedent and the unifying force of Full Faith and 
Credit by carving out exceptions for time, manner, 
and mechanisms for enforcement, as well as creating 
a tiered system of credit owed to acts, judgments, and 
records.126 Although inconsistent, the jurisprudence 
and Clause history will become a platform for this 
note’s urging that the Tenth Circuit’s rationale is the 
most consistent with the purpose of the Clause.
III. The Present: Circuit Split
Supreme Court Rule 10 speaks to the Court’s 
exercise of jurisdiction for writs of certiorari.127 The 
Rule states that a factor influencing the Court’s 
discretion is when a United States court of appeals 
has entered a decision in conflict with the decision 
of another United States court of appeals on the 
same “important matter.”128 No matter the minor 
factual differences, the Fifth and Tenth Circuits are 
split on three important matters: (1) what claims 
are actionable under § 1983, (2) how to treat birth 
certificates with adoption orders, and (3) which state 
actors are obligated under Full Faith and Credit. 
Because the Supreme Court passed on resolving 
the issue,129 future courts should recognize the split 
and consider competing arguments as to why one 
rationale is preferable over another.130
A.  Bad Facts Make Bad Law
A court may distinguish its holding from 
another court’s decision based on factual and legal 
distinctions, although these distinctions may not be 
the “important matters” of the cases.131 If this occurs, 
then the second court mistakenly creates a circuit-
split based on unimportant factual differences. A 
more noticeable split is created if the second court 
cites factual differences, which, in the end, are not 
differences at all. The Fifth Circuit has done just 
that.132
Most noticeably, the legal impediment facing 
the Adar couple was different from the one facing the 
Finstuen couple.133 That is to say, the Tenth Circuit 
found a statutory amendment unconstitutional, 
whereas the Fifth Circuit affirmed an administrative 
decision of a state actor. Not only was the Oklahoma 
amendment a more formal legislative act, it was more 
broadly worded than the administrative decision of 
the Louisiana Registrar. According to the amended 
Oklahoma statute, the state would “not recognize an 
adoption by more than one individual of the same sex 
from any other state . . . .”134 The Adar court, in contrast, 
insisted that the Registrar did recognize the validity 
of the out-of-state decree but merely determined its 
effects in accordance with Louisiana law.135 In fact, the 
Registrar offered to issue a Louisiana birth certificate 
listing one of the plaintiffs as a parent.136 Because 
the Clause commands states to recognize out-of-state 
judgments, Oklahoma’s broad non-recognition of all 
out-of-state decrees was so patently in violation of the 
Clause that it necessitated invalidation. The Tenth 
Circuit’s holding is thus inevitable, whereas the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision is merely explainable because the 
Louisiana Registrar’s actions were not so patently in 
violation of Full Faith and Credit. Nevertheless, this 
note argues that the Fifth Circuit’s denial of a birth 
certificate amounted to the same non-recognition of 
the adoption decree.137
Another factual distinction is the types 
of adoption in each case. The Adar couple jointly 
adopted Infant J as an unmarried couple.138 When 
they sought recognition and enforcement of that 
adoption, the Registrar and Fifth Circuit denied their 
request.139 On the other hand, the Finstuen couple 
sought recognition and enforcement of a stepparent 
adoption.140 California recognizes stepparent 
adoptions and gives them the effect of any other 
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adoption decreed in the state.141 Therefore, in terms of 
rights and responsibilities granted to adopted parents, 
the New York and California adoption orders carried 
the same weight for the respective parents.
Factually, these cases are not too different—
both couples sought the same legal recognition and 
enforcement of substantively similar adoptions. The 
Adar court attempted to distinguish these similar 
cases when it could have and should have adopted the 
Tenth Circuit’s rationale, which is more consistent 
with the Constitution and less detrimental to adoptive 
families. In contrast to the factual “distinctions,” the 
two circuits’ legal holdings are wholly opposite. This 
note urges that the legal differences are, in fact, the 
“important matters” which ultimately create a circuit 
split.
B.  The Important Matters
The Fifth Circuit’s narrow holding was that 
a violation of Full Faith and Credit is not actionable 
under § 1983, but the court expanded the holding 
in dicta.142 In Adar and Finstuen, the Fifth and 
Tenth Circuits reach different holdings on three 
vital issues: (1) federal jurisdiction under § 1983, 
(2) birth certificates vis-à-vis adoption orders, and 
(3) obligations of state actors under Full Faith and 
Credit. Thus, the courts created a split on these three 
important matters.
While the Fifth Circuit attempts to 
distinguish Finstuen on the jurisdictional issue, the 
court was misguided. The Fifth Circuit’s dismissal 
of subject matter jurisdiction creates a split with the 
Tenth Circuit’s exercise of jurisdiction. Specifically, 
the Tenth Circuit has allowed recovery for Full Faith 
and Credit violations under § 1983, whereas the Fifth 
Circuit has foreclosed on exercising such jurisdiction. 
Because the Finstuen court allowed recovery, the court 
clearly found the jurisdiction upon which to decide 
the case and grant relief.143 Although the majority of 
the Tenth Circuit opinion is devoted to justiciability, 
the absence of any discussion concerning subject 
matter jurisdiction does not mean the court lacked 
the jurisdiction.144 Thus, the varying treatments of 
Full Faith and Credit violations with § 1983 remedys 
constitute a split concerning an important legal 
issue—subject matter jurisdiction.
The circuits further differ on how each treats 
birth certificates vis-à-vis adoption decrees. The 
Oklahoma adoption statutes still afforded adoptive 
parents the ability to receive “a supplementary birth 
certificate . . . with the names of the adoptive parents 
listed as the parents.”145 For the Tenth Circuit, this 
practice of singling out some out-of-state adoption 
decrees as unrecognizable rendered the amendment 
unconstitutional, so the Doel couple was entitled to 
a birth certificate because of their adoption order.146
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit singled out 
the birth certificate as merely a mechanism of 
enforcement.147 The Adar court cited a Revised Statute 
and Children’s Code articles for its proposition that 
the couple does not have a right to a supplemental 
birth certificate.148 However, similar to Oklahoma, 
Louisiana has a statute granting adoptive parents 
the right to “a new certificate of live birth of the 
person adopted.”149 Louisiana also provides for the 
recognition of “foreign adoptions” which instructs 
the Registrar to make a “new record in its archives 
showing . . . the names of the adoptive parents . . . that 
[are] available and adds to the completeness of the 
certificate of the adopted child.”150 However, despite 
this directive to the state registrar, the Fifth Circuit 
singles out the birth certificate and places it “in the 
heartland of enforcement, and therefore outside the 
full faith and credit obligation of recognition.”151 
Thus, the Fifth Circuit does not see birth certificates 
as part-and-parcel of valid adoptions despite the plain 
language of Louisiana’s laws. This conclusion stands 
in stark contrast with the Tenth Circuit.
Finally, the circuits differ on which state 
actors are obligated by Full Faith and Credit. Again, 
the Tenth Circuit’s decision on this matter was not 
as detailed as the Fifth Circuit’s. Nevertheless, the 
Finstuen court directed the Oklahoma Commissioner 
of Health to issue a new birth certificate to the Doel 
couple in compliance with Full Faith and Credit.152 
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit granted the Louisiana 
Registrar immunity from Full Faith and Credit, even 
though the respective state officers have substantially 
similar duties for keeping records of vital statistics.153 
One may attempt to distinguish the two cases because 
the focus of the Tenth Circuit was an amendment and 
not the state actor’s decision. However, this distinction 
is irrelevant because the Finstuen court nevertheless 
directed the commissioner to comply with Full 
Faith and Credit and issue the birth certificate. The 
distinction is further without merit because, in both 
cases, the couples initially sought out the respective 
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state actors for the reissued birth certificates. Thus, in 
both cases, the state actor denied the request, yet only 
one circuit held the non-judicial state actor to the Full 
Faith and Credit obligation.
Although the Adar majority denied creating 
a circuit split by distinguishing Finstuen, the dissent 
rightfully pointed out that the majority did, in fact, 
create a split.154 This split ultimately highlights the 
difference in the respective courts’ treatments of the 
issues and demonstrates the superiority of the Tenth 
Circuit’s rationale concerning out-of-state adoptions. 
Future courts, then, will need guidance as to decide 
cases in line with either the Fifth or Tenth Circuit.
IV. The Future: Settling the Split
Applying the historical analysis of Full Faith 
and Credit to the split reveals that the Tenth Circuit’s 
rationale is the most consistent with the Clause. The 
effects of a sister-state’s judgment ought to be applied 
in the second-forum evenhandedly. Furthermore, 
the evidentiary nature of the Clause caused the Fifth 
Circuit to hold mistakenly that the Clause only binds 
state courts. Additionally, the broad principles of § 
1983 compel an interpretation giving plaintiffs a 
wide avenue into federal courts to seek redress for any 
rights—substantive or procedural. The Fifth Circuit 
narrowed rather than opened future litigants’ access 
to federal courts under § 1983.
A. Full Faith and Credit to the Rescue
Without clear indication from either the 
Clause’s history or case law, this article posits three 
alternative possibilities for resolving the existing 
circuit split.155 Combining history and jurisprudence, 
the split should be resolved consistent with the Tenth 
Circuit for three reasons: (1) the Framers sought a 
more unified country; (2) case law consistently 
states that judgments are the most protected class of 
documents; and (3) no exceptions ought to be made 
for the recognition of adoption decrees.
First, one may take an a fortiori approach 
to the Constitutional Clause.156 That is to say, if the 
Framers sought to create a less fragmented Union, 
then it follows that they sought a change from 
both the English court system and the Articles of 
Confederation. This is exemplified in the nationwide 
power Congress has to declare inter-state effects.157 
Congressional determination of effects of judgments 
unified the states with each other and marked a 
change from the English system and the Articles of 
Confederation. On the other hand, the Framers were 
either lawyers or familiar with English terminology 
used in the Articles of Confederation and thus 
understood the evidentiary meaning of “full faith 
and credit.”158 However, contextual quotes from 
James Madison and James Wilson indicate a different 
approach. No longer was the article supposed to 
be “indeterminate . . . and of little importance.”159 
Rather, the new article was to amalgamate the states 
into a new union so that each state could not ignore its 
federalist obligations. Under this analysis, the Clause 
imposes a much more stringent duty on states with 
respect to judgments, including adoption agreements. 
This is the Tenth Circuit’s view of not undermining 
the judgment of a sister-state whatsoever.
Secondly, early cases might have held that 
the first forum determines the effects of judgments, 
like adoption decrees.160 Although the Baker Court 
distinguished tiers of recognition for different classes 
of documents, the Court has never lessened the 
recognition due to judgments.161 This exception-free 
treatment of judgments is consistent with early quotes 
indicating that the Clause was meant to unite the 
separate states. Thus, under the Court’s assessment 
of judgments, adoption decrees are consistently given 
the highest level of faith and credit. States cannot 
make exceptions or temper a sister-state’s judgments. 
The Tenth Circuit decided Finstuen without 
making exceptions for a sister-state’s adoptions, thus 
conforming its decision to the Clause’s jurisprudence 
and history.
As for the scope of Full Faith and Credit, 
the Clause’s history perhaps excuses, but does not 
necessitate, the Fifth Circuit’s holding that Full 
Faith and Credit binds only courts. Because of the 
evidentiary force of the Clause’s first sentence, one 
might think that only courts should be concerned 
with Full Faith and Credit.162 However, the plain 
language of the Clause speaks to states as a whole.163 
Furthermore, the classes of protected documents 
extend to every branch of government: legislative 
(“public acts”), executive (“records”), and judicial 
(“judgments”). These two elements of the Clause 
indicate that Full Faith and Credit obligates state 
actors across the board, not just the judiciary. 
Although Congress’s 1790 Act speaks to “courts” 
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specifically as under the command of full faith and 
credit, early legislators were likely concerned only 
with the evidentiary role of the Clause rather than 
interstate effects of judgments.164 The fact that the 
rest of the statute addresses how courts authenticate 
documents for evidence bolsters this argument.165 The 
early Congress balked on the issue of declaring the 
effects of judgments, meaning it only addressed the 
Clause’s evidentiary aspect. Therefore, the 1790 Act 
only addresses evidence and necessarily only speaks to 
courts.166 This notion does not, and cannot, derogate 
from the Constitutional command, which speaks to 
states as a whole. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit was 
misguided when it applied the inter-state command 
to courts alone. The Tenth Circuit’s implicit holding 
that non-judicial state actors are obligated is more in 
line with the historic analysis of the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause.
Finally, more specific to the cases at hand, 
recent jurisprudence and state adoption statutes read 
together indicate that the Tenth Circuit’s rationale is 
more fitting. New York’s adoption procedures, despite 
the lack of some adversarial setting, are certainly 
“judgments” because they determine the best interest 
of the child and pronounce the legal transformation of 
the biological and adoptive parents’ relationship to the 
child.167 Because Full Faith and Credit is “exacting” for 
judgments, courts have almost no leeway in denying 
recognition of judgments like adoption decrees.168 
The denial of a birth certificate puts an onerous 
burden on an adoptive parent attempting to prove 
legal parenthood, which may amount to effective 
non-recognition of the adoption decree. 169 Because 
the jurisprudence and adoption statutes indicate that 
judgments are to be given the highest level of faith 
and credit, any practice that even subtly undermines 
the inter-state recognition of adoption decrees ought 
to be greatly scrutinized. The Fifth Circuit imposed 
such a burden on adoptive parents, whereas the Tenth 
Circuit did not. The remaining resolution, then, is 
the federal redressability of § 1983 for Full Faith and 
Credit claims.
B. Petitioners at the Doorway: 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Section 1983 of Title 42 broadly states the 
rights it protects: any “rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws.”170 So long as 
the rights created by some law are “enforceable,” the 
section provides protection for violations of those 
rights and an avenue into federal court.171 The Court 
has articulated three purposes for the statute: (1) to 
“override certain kinds of state laws”; (2) to “provide 
a remedy where state law was inadequate”; and (3) “to 
provide for a federal remedy where the state remedy . 
. . was not available in practice.”172
This expansive avenue into federal court, 
however, is not without limitations. For example, 
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits unsuccessful 
state court173 plaintiffs from reasserting their claim 
in federal court under § 1983.174 Furthermore, the 
section does not create an independent right; rather, 
it only protects existing rights.175 Nevertheless, these 
enforceable rights are not restricted to substantive 
rights; rather, the Court has established a factored 
test to determine the enforceability of rights under 
§ 1983.176
The first factor addresses whether a law 
contains a “federal right,” which, if found, creates a 
rebuttable presumption that the right is enforceable 
under § 1983.177 The presumption is defeated only if 
there is “textual indication” that Congress intended 
to foreclose a remedy within the law that granted 
the right.178 Jurisprudence has further provided 
factors to aid courts in deciding the first inquiry.179 
Courts first ask whether “Congress . . . intended 
that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff . 
. . . Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
right assertedly protected by the statute is not so 
‘vague and amorphous’ that its enforcement would 
strain the judicial competence . . . . Third, the statute 
must unambiguously impose a binding obligation 
on the States . . . couched in mandatory rather than 
precatory terms.”180
Thus, on the one hand, courts have held 
that the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Medicaid 
statute, and other federal laws grant rights enforceable 
under § 1983.181 On the other hand, the Court has 
held that the Supremacy Clause, the Natural Born 
Citizen Clause, ERISA, and the Telecommunications 
Act do not grant enforceable rights.182 Courts 
denying the enforceability of rights generally cite the 
comprehensive nature of the statutes that preclude 
additional recovery under § 1983.183 Other concerns 
are that laws do not convey a personal right or that 
the rights are too amorphous to be enforceable.184 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause passes this test. 
The Clause grants a right—procedural or not—to an 
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individual to have a sister-state recognize a judgment. 
The right is not “vague or amorphous” because it is 
clear in its intention to relieve litigants from having 
to retry their case in every forum and to bind the 
states in recognition of those judgments. Finally, the 
Clause is phrased in mandatory terms—“Full Faith 
and Credit shall be given . . . .”185
As applied to the circuit split, the plain 
words and precedent indicate that the statute be 
read as broadly as possible for enforcing rights of 
the Constitution or federal laws.186 The Adar court 
determined that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does 
not create any substantive rights, merely procedural 
rights.187 Although this may be a mischaracterization 
of the couple’s claim,188 the language of § 1983 and 
the case law explain that any right granted by the 
Constitution or its statutes is enforceable under the 
statute.189 The law does not distinguish, nor should 
the court.190 The Clause grants adoptive parents the 
right to have their adoption decrees recognized by 
interstate courts—a right protected under the plain 
language and case history of § 1983.
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit was misguided 
when it argued against a potential procedural 
protection.191 As mentioned, the Supreme Court has 
articulated very broad purposes for the statute.192 
Therefore, for the Fifth Circuit to rationalize its 
holding based on an argument that § 1983 is too 
protective of plaintiff ’s rights clearly go against the 
Court’s express articulation of the statute’s purpose.
This historical analysis and jurisprudence 
examinations illustrate that the existing Adar/Finstuen 
split should be resolved in favor of the Tenth Circuit’s 
rationale. The Finstuen decision upholds the function 
of Full Faith and Credit in a newer, more unified 
nation. The Tenth Circuit also makes no exceptions 
for a sister-state’s judgment and it correctly applies 
Full Faith and Credit to all state actors. Finally, the 
Tenth Circuit also keeps open the broad avenue of 
federal courts for § 1983 litigants. Holdings contrary 
to these rationales will result in substantial harm to 
certain classes of people.
V. The Future: Some Parents Will Not Be 
Parents
This section will address the legal and factual 
errors of Adar. This section shows that, without 
proper resolution of the circuit split, these effects 
will continue to hamper the parental rights and put 
children at a severe disadvantage. Extrapolating Adar’s 
holding highlights the decision’s detrimental effects 
for homosexual couples and their legally adopted 
children. It also shows that future courts ought not 
perpetuate these detrimental effects by deciding cases 
in line with the Tenth Circuit.
A. Legal Blunders of Adar
Besides the mistakes pointed out in the Adar 
dissent and the issues regarding the circuit split, Adar 
is flawed for several reasons.193 First, the Fifth Circuit 
superficially assessed the couple’s claim by glossing 
over the substantive rights and limiting its assessment 
to the inter-state vehicle, the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause.194 Because of this insincere valuation, the court 
dismissed the claim as procedural, not substantive.195 
Furthermore, the court mistakenly claimed that the 
decision would not frustrate any right conferred by 
the New York adoption decree.196
1. Parenthood is More Than Procedure
The Fifth Circuit did away with the Adar 
couple’s claim because § 1983 does not protect 
procedural rights.197 However, the court failed to 
fully appreciate the couple’s claim when it addressed 
only the legal procedure for recognition of rights. 
Beneath the veneer of Full Faith and Credit lay the 
couple’s economic, legal, and social rights. Adoption 
is inherently transformational—extinguishing 
the rights and duties of the biological parents and 
conferring them upon the adoptive parents.198 
These rights constituted the couple’s claim—not a 
procedural mechanism.
 a. Economic Benefits
After the adoption is finalized, adoptive 
parents are given a substantial amount of economic 
benefits. There are some far-fetched examples of these 
economic benefits, but many are practical for adoptive 
parents.199 Common examples of the economic 
benefit of parenthood are the tax consequence of 
“writing off ” expenses or the individual right to child 
support.200 Without a birth certificate listing one’s 
self as a “parent,” an individual would have trouble 
enforcing these rights. These typical economic rights 
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of parenthood were the rights that the Adar couple 
was seeking to enjoy with a re-issued birth certificate.
For a practical application of these rights, 
imagine the consequences if, upon crossing the 
Louisiana border, an unlisted parent decided to 
ignore his obligation to contribute to the expenses of 
rearing the child. The left-behind spouse would have 
little to no recourse to recover financial aid from the 
other person, despite the fact that a court determined 
both parents were morally fit and declared them 
both the legally adoptive parents of the child.201 The 
Fifth Circuit cited this unstable relationship as the 
reason for Louisiana’s prohibiting unmarried couples 
from adopting—the “freely severable” nature of such 
relationships might hurt the child and left-behind 
spouse.202 However, if the court and state were serious 
about protecting the family, the court and state would 
want to insure that the left-behind spouse had some 
redress against a delinquent “parent.” Without a birth 
certificate evidencing that the irresponsible individual 
is a legal parent of the child, the other spouse is unduly 
burdened with the full costs of rearing the child. This 
scenario results in a secondary denial—first, the state 
denies a birth certificate request; second, the state 
denies recourse to recover financial aid from the other 
parent. This double denial will continue to affect 
adoptive families if future courts adhere to the Adar 
rationale rather than Finstuen.
 b.  Non-Economic Benefits
Without any hard data, one would not think 
that tax benefits or inheritance rights would factor 
into the decision to adopt. Rather, the legal and social 
non-economic benefits that are enjoyed by parents 
and perceived by others everyday are the common-
sense perks of parenthood.
Legal benefits include everyday decisions 
parents make for the child. Generally, any situation 
wherein a parent represents a child as his agent is the 
parent’s legal right. These situations include choosing 
where to enroll the child in school and making 
medical and emergency decisions for the child.203 
Other aspects of parenthood involve access to the 
child’s legal documents and the right to contact the 
child’s biological parents after adoption.204 Finally, 
the social benefits of parenthood may be the most 
important for adoptive parents. Social benefits 
include day-to-day rearing of the child, influencing 
the child’s development, and watching the child 
grow. While a parent does not necessarily need a 
birth certificate to be a positive influence on a child, 
legal recognition becomes immensely important if 
the couple splits up.205 Parents who completed the 
adoption proceedings have evidenced a strong desire 
to become a parent, and each parent is entitled to his or 
her social parental rights. At the end of a relationship, 
a parent without a birth certificate might lose the 
right to custody and visitation.206 In this sense, a legal 
document memorializing legal parenthood is crucial 
for parents seeking their non-economic rights.
The situation of the Finstuen couple captures 
these benefits well. Their child required swift medical 
attention, an emergency ambulance ride, a potentially 
life-saving decision, and a stay in an emergency 
room.207 One parent was not able to ride in the 
ambulance and had trouble getting into the hospital 
room because she did not have a birth certificate.208 
If the legally recognized parent was not there, the 
un-listed person might have been unable to exercise 
her decision-making authority, resulting in further 
injury to the adopted child. The legal ability to make 
these decisions is beneficial for the child’s health and 
equally important as a parental right.
Thus, in Adar the parents sought the ability 
to enjoy these substantive rights of parenthood—
economic, legal, and social. Full Faith and Credit 
was merely the vehicle carrying these rights from 
state to state. However, the Fifth Circuit’s assessment 
superficially glanced at the couple’s complaint and 
labeled the rights asserted as merely procedural 
rather than substantive. This dismissal of the Adar 
couple’s claims effectively denied them enjoyment 
of their substantive parental rights.209 Future courts 
deciding these issues would perpetuate this denial of 
substantive rights if they adhere to Adar.
2. The Parents are Frustrated
The Adar court held that the couple’s 
adoption was validly recognized and that the State 
had not “frustrated” their rights.210 For the court to 
maintain this holding, it must follow that the parents 
do not need birth certificates to fully enjoy substantive 
parental rights.211 This is not the case, however, and 
future courts ought not to make the same mistake.
Louisiana’s statute regarding the evidentiary 
value of birth certificates contradicts the court’s 
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holding.212 The statute states that birth certificates 
serve as “prima facie evidence of the facts therein 
stated.”213 The content, or facts, of a birth certificate 
are also statutorily determined, and they include 
information about the child and parents—residences, 
races, surnames, maiden names, etc. 214 These statutes, 
read together, declare that birth certificates serve 
as prima facie evidence of the parents’ identities. 
Because certificates evidence who the parents are, 
those parents need the legal document to prove their 
parental status and enjoy their parental rights. The 
Fifth Circuit claimed it had not “frustrated” the 
couple’s rights, but Louisiana law clearly reveals that 
birth certificates serve as legal evidence of determining 
who the parents are.215 Without evidence, parents are 
sure to face frustrations in enforcing their substantive 
parental rights.
It may be that in some situations, an adoption 
decree alone is not needed to enjoy the various 
benefits of parenthood.216 However, the withholding 
of a birth certificate surely serves as an unnecessary 
obstacle for adoptive parents. These parents have 
already filed numerous forms and affidavits and have 
been judicially examined for moral fitness.217 Adding 
another administrative hurdle to proving the validity 
of an out-of-state adoption decree frustrates parental 
rights, and the Adar court disregarded this burden for 
adoptive parents when it held otherwise.218
Because judgments are greatly protected 
and should not be undermined, this burden is also 
likely unconstitutional.219 As the Tenth Circuit aptly 
noted, the denial of the birth certificate is the denial 
of the effective operation of the judgment.220 The 
Fifth Circuit’s effective denial undermines the most 
protected judgments and frustrates, if not denies, 
parents’ substantive rights.221 This frustration will 
continue under Adar’s precedent.
B. Extrapolating Adar
Besides the Fifth Circuit’s legal errors, the 
court’s holding will have detrimental effects for several 
classes of people: homosexual parents, adoptive 
parents, and adopted children. Going forward, the 
Adar decision will allow state officials to single out, 
at their whim, individuals seeking the enforcement 
of rights from out of state. The decision also places 
homosexuals in a Catch-22 rendering them unable to 
receive certain family rights whatsoever. Finally, this 
decision ultimately hurts not only the parents, but 
the child as well.
1. Unbridled Discretion
Non-judicial state actors are currently free 
to disregard Full Faith and Credit obligations under 
Adar.222 This freedom alone would allow non-
judicial state actors wide latitude to undermine the 
most protected class of documents and disregard 
the determinations of a sister state. Moreover, under 
Adar, liability-free actors can single out the effective 
operations of sister-state judgments. Thus, state 
actors have a dual-layered protection for violating 
Full Faith and Credit. States can create self-governed 
mechanisms to deny a judgment’s effective operation 
and certain actors are not even obligated by Full Faith 
and Credit.223
If the Adar court allowed this type of 
denial for a judgment—an adoption decree—then 
subsequent courts will certainly be able to deny 
operation for lesser protected acts and records. 
Drivers’ licenses provide an instructive example. Law 
enforcement officers will not have to acknowledge an 
out-of-state license because licenses are a state’s own 
mechanism of enforcement. Thus, a driver would 
have to seek each state’s mechanism where he wishes 
to drive—that is, he would have to apply for a license 
in each state’s DMV. This is assuming, of course, that 
policemen even think about Full Faith and Credit 
when they discretionarily deny recognition. After all, 
the second layer of protection means that the Clause 
does not apply to police officers.224
From a national point of view, this result is 
the precisely the opposite of that compelled when one 
considers the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause. With each actor free from liability choosing 
which judgments to give effect to, the nation becomes 
a patchwork of recognition and enforcement. While 
some states might be willing to issue new certificates 
or recognize drivers’ licenses—thus giving operation 
to the judgment or record—some states may not. 
This end game smacks of a country of “Independent 
Nations,”225 each free to ignore another’s judgment 
vis-à-vis a denial of effective operation.226 This result 
is inconsistent with the view of the Framers and the 
Constitution itself.227
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2. Homosexuals: Never Spouses nor 
Parents
With the newfound discretion and immunity 
for certain state actors, one has to wonder what criteria 
will influence that discretion. Of course, any decision 
based on gender, race, or sex might subject the actor 
to an Equal Protection claim.228 Homosexuals have 
not yet been so statutorily protected.229 Although the 
Louisiana adoption statute only prohibits unmarried 
couples from adopting, one need not stretch the 
imagination to see that non-judicial state officials will 
discriminate against homosexuals with statutes, the 
discretion, and the Full Faith and Credit immunity 
granted by the Adar court.230
Non-judicial state officers’ discretion and 
immunity can have an awful impact on homosexual 
couples through the denial of the effective operation 
of out-of-state judgments. Of course, homosexuals 
will not be the only class discriminated against with 
state actors’ newfound powers of discretion and 
immunity. There will certainly be others. However, 
unlike other discriminated classes, homosexuals will 
be ensnared in a catch-22 when it comes to family 
matters. That is to say, if an unmarried heterosexual 
couple wishes to circumvent the Louisiana statute to 
receive a Louisiana birth certificate, they need only 
to marry each other.231 A gay couple cannot marry 
in Louisiana (and many other states) to escape the 
statute’s prohibition against unmarried couples 
from adopting.232 Thus, homosexual couples can do 
nothing to become either spouses or parents—stuck 
in this family rights abyss.
3. Child as Ultimate Sufferer
The parents’ loss of substantive rights can be 
considered from the adoptee’s point-of-view. If a state 
actor chooses not to list either adoptive parent on a 
birth certificate, the child will be stuck in a parent-
less limbo where the biological parents no longer have 
any rights but the State is frustrating or denying the 
adoptive parents’ substantive rights.
For example, the child ought to be able to 
inherit from both adoptive parents and may need 
a birth certificate to do so.233 This illustrates how 
the denial of a birth certificate hampers the child’s 
substantive rights. Another practical example would 
be the issue of child support. As discussed, the non-
listed parent might be free to ignore his obligation 
to contribute finances for the child.234 Besides the 
effect on the other parent, the child will likely suffer 
the most harm from that scenario, as he is the one 
with fewer resources. Furthermore, there are practical 
considerations, which might impact the child’s 
development; the most noticeable would be the issue 
of custody and visitation.235 A child’s relationship 
with his parents is a deeply psychological one.236 
A parent faces an obstacle for custody or visitation 
rights with the adoptee if he does not have a birth 
certificate. From the child’s point-of-view, then, the 
inability to see and visit a parent with whom he grew 
up will detrimentally affect his personal development. 
In a broader sense, a child’s loss of all these substantive 
rights might render the child parent-less as soon as he 
crosses a state-line.
Ultimately, the state is presumed to have 
the best interest of the child in making decisions of 
family law. Without birth certificates evidencing a 
complete and “normal” family, the adopted children 
might lose economic support of a former parent, lose 
total contact with the parent, and even question the 
legitimacy of their own family structure. All of these 
effects carry long-term psychological damages.237 
These detriments will continue if future courts do 
not resolve the current circuit split in line with the 
Tenth Circuit.
IV. Conclusion
In Article IV, the Constitution addresses 
the internal workings of sister states in relation to 
one another. Coming out of a fragmented system 
of government, the Framers sought a more perfect 
Union. One aspect of this new society would be the 
level of respect each state owed to another, and over 
the years, judicial decisions have been regarded as the 
most protected class of sister-state documents. Because 
adoption decrees are the judicial proclamation of 
legal parenthood, transforming formerly childless 
people into full-fledged parents, these decrees deserve 
the same level of exacting faith and credit. Nothing 
ought to undermine the decrees or their effects. 
When a state refuses to grant birth certificates to 
some adopting couples, the state is denying the 
effective operation of those adoption decrees, which 
is not only unconstitutional, but also detrimental to 
couples and, more importantly, the children. The 
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Fifth Circuit’s decision in Adar v. Smith created a 
circuit-split on important issues of procedure and 
Constitutional interpretation. The Fifth Circuit has 
perpetuated an unconstitutional and discriminatory 
practice of denying adopting parents the full benefits 
of legal parenthood. Consequently, future courts 
should resolve the existing circuit split in line with the 
Tenth Circuit whose decision concerning out-of-state 
adoption decrees conforms with the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause and causes less harm to several classes 
of citizens: homosexual parents and adoptive families.
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Whitten, Full Faith and Credit for Dummies, 38 Creighton L. 
Rev. 465 (2005); Daniel Crane, Original Understanding of “Effects 
Clause” of FFC and DOMA, 6 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 307 (1998).
90 See Engdahl, supra note 91.
91 Id. at 1598.
92 Id.
93 See generally Whitten, supra note 91.
94 See generally Crane, supra note 91, at 316.
95 Sachs, supra note 89, at 1221.
96 Madison, Notes from the Constitutional Convention 
546 (1987).
97 From Madison’s Conventional Notes, it seems that 
discussions took approximately four days to negotiate the final 
version of the Clause during a convention that lasted around four 
months. See id. at 546, 570.
98 Id. at 546.
99 Id. at 546, 570.
100 See id.; U.S. Const. art. IV § 1.
101 Supra, note 96 at 570.
102 Supra, note 90.
103 See generally Engdahl,, supra note 90; see also Peck v. 
Williamson, 19 F. Cas. 85 (C.C.D.N.C. 1813).
104 See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 90, at 1630.
105 Id. The subsequent re-enactments of the 1790 Act did make 
additions and some changes. For example, the term “such faith 
and credit” was altered to “same faith and credit.” Also, public 
acts were included in a later enactment. For a more scholarly 
discussion of these changes, see Engdahl, supra note 90.
106 Robert Jackson, Full Faith and Credit: a Lawyer’s Clause of 
the Constitution, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1945).
107 Crane, supra note 90, at 334 (“The Effects Clause has 
spawned no case law lineage and very little discussion as a subject 
distinct from the Full Faith and Credit Clause.”).
108 Id.
109 See id. at 310.
110 See generally Scott Ruskay-Kidd, Defense of Marriage Act and 
the Overextension of Congressional Authority, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 
1435 (1997).
111 William Reynolds & William Richman, The Full Faith 
and Credit Clause: A Reference Guide to the united 
States Constitution 123 (2005).
112 By citing to this Act, I am not conceding that Congress had 
the right to pass this legislation. The constitutionality of DOMA 
is outside the scope of this article. I am merely making the point 
that the Congress has recently attempted to act on its power more 
seriously.
113 See Armstrong v. Carson’s Ex’rs, 2 U.S. 302, 303 (C.C.D. 
Pa. 1794).
114 Peck v. Williamson, 19 F. Cas. 85, 85 (C.C.D.N.C. 1813).
115 Mills v. Duryee, 11. U.S. 481 (1813). Inerestingly, Chief 
Justice Marshall joined Justice Story’s opinion in this case, though 
Marshall penned the opposite view in Peck, 19 F. Cas. at 85.
116 Mills, 11 U.S. at 484.
117 Engdahl, supra note 90, at 1636.
118 See, e.g., Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222 (1984).
119 Id.
120 Id. at 240-41.
121 See id. The function of Full Faith and Credit “was to 
alter the status of the several states as independent foreign 
sovereignties, each free to ignore the obligations…of the others, 
and to make them integral parts of a single nation.” Id. at 223 
(citing Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 
277 (1935)). This function is necessary because “the practical 
operation of the federal system which the Constitution designed, 
demanded it.” Id. at 233 (citing Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 
(1948)).
122 Id. at 232.
123 Id. at 235.
124 Id. at 222-23.
125 Compare Armstrong v. Carson, 2 U.S. 302 (C.C.D. Pa. 
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